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TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO CH TW HA

SUBJECT: CHINESE THREATEN VETO OF MINUSTAH MANDATE ABSENT
WRITTEN ASSURANCES FROM HAITI ON TAIWAN

REF: A. USUN 2299

1B. BEIJING 371

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR WILLIAM BRENCICK FOR REASON
S 1.4 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (C) Following up on earlier conversations (ref A), Chinese PolMinCouns Li Junhua approached USUN PolMinCouns on January 16 to provide an update on PRC concerns about renewing the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) given Haiti's support for Taiwan at the UN. After noting that the decisions he was relaying had been made by FM Li and enjoyed the explicit approval of President Hu, Junhua said he had three points to make: first, China could not accept more than a six month extension of the MINUSTAH mandate; second, the UNSC should be looking for ways to make this renewal the last such extension and seek to downsize MINUSTAH in preparation for that final decision; third, the Haitian government "at an authoritative level" would have to provide assurances that its "provocative" actions vis-a-vis Taiwan would not be repeated.

¶2. (C) Li added that these assurances would "of course" have to be written as President Preval had already provided oral assurances to PR Wang that were not honored in practice. With some frustration, Li related a conversation that Chinese Trade Rep Zhang had had in Port au Prince last week in which he was again flatly refused such written assurances. Drawing on his good command of English language idiom, Li added that the Haitians "just didn't seem to get it" when dealing with China and the Taiwan issue. Again alluding to a possible veto, Li concluded that the Haitians were playing with fire because China had not abandoned its determination to "stop MINUSTAH in its tracks" if necessary. (Note: While Li's manner was friendly enough, it was also clear that he was being deadly earnest about the consequences for MINUSTAH if Haiti failed to improve its relationship with China. End Note.)

¶3. (C) During an initial expert-level Friends of Haiti meeting on January 16 to begin drafting the resolution to renew MINUSTAH's mandate, the French, Brazilian, Argentine, and Peruvian representatives confirmed that they had received the same message about Haiti from the Chinese Mission to the UN earlier that day. The French expert said his colleagues in Beijing had also been demarched by the Chinese MFA. Separately, Chinese PR Wang met with U/SYG for Peacekeeping Guehenno January 17 to discuss the matter. Guehenno's special assistant told USUN deputy polcouns that Wang conveyed China's view that stability had returned to Haiti and that therefore the mandate should only be extended for a final six months. Wang also suggested that Haiti did not fully appreciate MINUSTAH and the contribution of the UN. Based on this conversation, the UN's Peacekeeping Department fears China is ready to exercise its veto.

WOLFF